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Domestic regime type has emerged a powerful explanation of multiple phenomena in world 
politics. This article extends this argument to the design of international organizations (IOs), 
where a profound development in recent decades is growing access for transnational actors 
(TNAs). While earlier research has shown that democracy in IO memberships helps to explain 
IO openness, we know little about the mechanisms that drive this effect. This article unpacks 
the relationship between democratic memberships and IO design by theorizing and assessing 
the impact of three different constellations of democracies on the openness of IOs. 
Empirically, we conduct a multivariate analysis of TNA access to 50 IOs 1950 to 2010, 
combined with a case study of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Our 
main findings are three-fold. First, democracy’s effect on openness is primarily a product of 
the combined weight of democracies within IOs and their resulting capacity to secure support 
for their polity preferences. Second, in contrast, we only find limited support for a specific 
influence of new democracies and democratic major powers on IO openness. Third, decision 
rules that allow for openness reforms to be adopted by a majority of member states facilitate 
and strengthen the influence of democracies, by reducing the ability of autocracies to block 
change. The findings have implications for our understanding of institutional design in global 
governance and democracy’s effects in world politics. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A growing body of research privileges domestic regime type as an explanation of world 
politics. This explanation is most commonly associated with the democratic peace program 
(Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Yet, over the past fifteen years, interest in 
regime type as an explanation has extended to a broad range of international political 
phenomena, including trade liberalization (Mansfield et al. 2000; Kono 2006), public-goods 
provision (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bättig and Bernauer 2009), human rights 
protection (Moravcsik 2000; Simmons and Danner 2010), democracy promotion (Pevehouse 
2005), international cooperation (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Poast and Urpelainen 
2013), and dispute settlement (Keohane et al. 2000; Davis 2012). These analyses are broadly 
consistent with a liberal approach to world politics through their emphasis on how democratic 
norms and institutions enable and constrain leaders and governments (Moravcsik 1997). 
Taken together, these contributions suggest that the nature of political regimes affects how 
states behave and organize in world politics. In this article, we extend and refine this 
argument as it applies to the design of international organizations (IOs). 
 One of the most profound shifts in the design of IOs in recent decades has been the 
expansion of institutional arrangements for the participation of transnational actors (TNAs), 
such as non-governmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, scientific communities, 
and multinational corporations (e.g., Raustiala 1997; O’Brien at al. 2000; Steffek et al. 2008; 
Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Scholte 2011; Risse 2012; Tallberg et al. 2013). IOs increasingly 
consult with TNAs in the formulation of new policy, invite TNAs to make statements in 
decision-making bodies, involve TNAs in the implementation of policy, and engage TNAs as 
watchdogs of state compliance. This is a development that spans IOs in all world regions and 
policy areas, and that has been particularly intense since the end of the Cold War. According 
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to one estimate, 56 percent of IOs offered some form of access to TNAs in 1990, while more 
than 90 percent did so in 2010 (Tallberg et al. 2013, 74). At the same time, already open IOs 
have become increasingly generous. For instance, the World Bank’s inclusion of civil society 
organizations in projects increased from 21 percent in 1990 to 81 percent in 2009 (World 
Bank 2014). 
 There is growing evidence that such TNA involvement matters for the legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and distributional outcomes of international cooperation (Risse 2012). 
Normative research highlights the contribution of TNA involvement to democratic legitimacy 
through its effects on transparency, participation, and accountability in IOs (e.g., Grant and 
Keohane 2005; Macdonald 2008; Steffek et al. 2008; Scholte 2011). Empirical research in the 
same area finds that civil society involvement positively affects public support for global 
governance (Bernauer and Gampfer 2013). Similarly, many studies establish that TNA 
involvement has positive consequences for the problem-solving capacity of IOs, by making 
IOs more efficient and effective in fulfilling their mandates (e.g., Raustiala 1997; Betsill and 
Corell 2008; Alter 2014).1 However, research also suggests that TNA involvement can have 
distributional effects, since TNAs have interests too, and IO access provides them with 
additional channels to pursue these interests (Bouwen 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Betsill 
and Corell 2008; Klüver 2013).  
 Existing research points to three main explanations of the opening up of IOs: domestic 
democracy among IO member states, demand for the resources and services of TNAs, and 
diffusion of participatory governance as an organizational model (Raustiala 1997; Grigorescu 
2007; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009; Saurugger 2010; Steffek 2013; Tallberg et al. 2013.). In 
this article, we focus in depth on the first of these factors, which has been shown to have a 
profound effect on the access of TNAs to IOs, but received no detailed analysis in earlier 
                                                     
1
 For a contrarian view, see Cooley and Ron (2002). 
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research. Existing analyses demonstrate that the average level of democracy in IO 
memberships constitutes the most powerful predictor of patterns in openness across 
organizations and over time (Grigorescu 2007; Tallberg et al. 2013). It is no coincidence that 
democratic clubs, such as the Council of Europe, were among the first IOs to open up; that the 
third wave of democratization preceded the growth in openness over the past two decades; 
and that IOs in world regions where democracy is strong offer most access to TNAs. Figure 1 
offers an illustration of this relationship, highlighting how domestic democracy and IO 
openness have tended to co-vary over time. 
 The purpose of this article is to unpack this relationship. What drives democracy’s effect 
on the transnational design of IOs? Existing research has left this central question open, being 
content with establishing a relationship, while making no claims to distinguish between 
alternative causal pathways. Yet understanding the effects of domestic regimes on global 
governance is essential. By establishing how and why democracies shape IO openness, we 
can isolate the conditions under which states share authority with private actors, the logics 
that drive the institutional design of IOs, and the scope of democracy’s effects on 
international political outcomes. 
 We address democracy’s effect on IO openness by evaluating three distinct 
mechanisms, each linked to a specific constellation of democracies within IOs. The first 
mechanism suggests that openness originates from the polity preferences of democracies and 
these member states’ combined weight in IOs. The second mechanism stipulates that 
openness is the result of credible commitment motives among new democracies anxious to 
lock in domestic reforms, where TNAs can help to raise domestic and international audience 
costs from defection. The third mechanism attributes openness to the influence of democratic 
great powers with a disproportionate influence over the design of IOs. In addition, we analyze 
whether and how the institutional rules governing decision-making in IOs condition the  
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Figure 1. Domestic Democracy and IO Openness 
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influence of these alternative constellations of democracies on IO openness. Empirically, we 
assess and illustrate the explanatory power of these mechanisms through a nested mixed-
method design (Lieberman, 2005) that combines a multivariate analysis of TNA access to 50 
IOs over the time period 1950-2010 with an in-depth model-testing case study of TNA access 
to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
 We argue that democracy’s effect on openness primarily is a product of the combined 
weight of democracies within IOs, and their resulting capacity to secure support for their 
polity preferences. In our account, democracies and autocracies hold competing polity 
preferences, rooted in their respective domestic political systems. Governments in liberal 
democracies work to extend the constitutive principles of democracy to global governance. 
Openness toward civil society is one such constitutive feature of democracy, alongside 
accountability, participation, and rule of law. Since autocratic regimes do not share this 
commitment to democratic ideals, the likelihood of openness depends on the relative weight 
of democracies within IOs. The more IOs are dominated by democracies, the more likely it is 
that openness reforms will be adopted. The analysis shows this relationship to hold 
irrespective of the institutional rules governing decision-making within IOs. The strength of 
this relationship offers an important clue to the expansion of openness in global governance 
after the end of the Cold War: As the number of democracies in the international system 
increased through the third wave of democratization, this shifted the balance between 
autocracies and democracies within IOs, creating more favorable conditions for an extension 
of openness in global governance. 
 In contrast, we only find mixed evidence that new democracies and democratic major 
powers have been particularly influential in the expansion of openness, as theories of credible 
commitments and state power would lead us to expect. While the presence of new 
democracies or democratic major powers in an IO’s membership matters little on its own, it 
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matters in conjunction with a largely democratic membership under conditions of majority 
rule. Hence, where institutional rules facilitate the adoption of openness reforms, having 
newly democratized states or major powers in the democratic membership helps to further 
expand openness in global governance. 
 The remainder of this article is organized in four parts. In the next section, we develop 
the three mechanisms linking democratic memberships and IO openness. We then proceed to 
the multivariate analysis, where we establish that the combined weight of democracies best 
accounts for IOs’ openness toward TNAs, and discuss the substantial significance of this 
effect. As a third step, we test the robustness of these findings by tracing how changes in the 
democratic density of the OSCE translated into openness reforms in the early 1990s. We 
conclude by briefly summarizing the findings and outlining the broader implications of the 
argument.  
 
 
2 The Argument: Domestic Democracy and IO Openness 
 
Why would domestic democracy in IO memberships generate higher levels of openness 
toward transnational actors? We identify three distinct mechanisms, privileging polity 
preferences, credible commitments, and great power influence. Each mechanism is associated 
with a particular actor constellation: all democracies, new democracies, and democratic major 
powers. 
 First, the opening up of IOs may be driven by the polity preferences of the democratic 
component of an IO’s membership. This argument assumes that democracies and autocracies 
hold systematically different preferences on dimensions of IO design that tap into constitutive 
differences between democracies and autocracies. This logic is sometimes referred to as 
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“liberal constructivism” (Risse-Kappen 1996) or “ideational liberalism” (Moravcsik 1997), as 
it derives the preferences that states promote internationally from domestic commitments to 
particular political values and institutions. It conventionally translates into the expectation that 
democracies seek to extend abroad the liberal ideals to which they adhere domestically. 
 In this view, openness toward civil society is a constitutive feature of democratic 
political systems, next to free and fair elections, freedom of expression, transparency, 
accountability, and rule of law (Tocqueville 1835). While democracies organize their 
relations with civil society in various ways, ranging from corporatist to pluralistic 
arrangements, interaction with autonomous societal actors is an integral aspect of all. 
Extending such democratic features to IOs is therefore not a radical step for democracies, 
since it involves applying the same procedural standards to all levels of political organization. 
 Existing research points to several examples of democratic states pursuing polity 
preferences derived from democracy as a system of government. Grigorescu (2007, 2010) 
finds that IOs dominated by democracies are more likely to institute mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability. Several scholars argue that the principle of rule of law leads 
democracies to push for and accept intrusive international dispute settlement (Kahler 2000; 
Keohane et al. 2000; Acharya and Johnston 2007). Related, Simmons (2009) finds that 
democracies are particularly willing to regulate rights protection internationally. 
 For autocracies, by contrast, openness toward TNAs is both foreign and dangerous. 
Processes of democratization have often been driven by civil society actors, mobilizing 
popular opposition, demanding regime change, and supporting alternative elites (Przeworski 
1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1996; Diamond 1999). Autocratic rulers are therefore anxious 
to maintain strict control over domestic civil society, either through repression or co-optation 
into the state apparatus (Bermeo and Nord 2000; Heurlin 2010). In this context, TNA access 
to IOs presents a channel whereby domestic opposition groups can bypass the control of the 
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regime and join international allies in criticizing authoritarian policies (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). Autocracies have every interest to cut such processes short and no interest to promote 
them. Examples of authoritarian attempts to restrict the international reach of domestic 
opposition groups include China’s curbs on human rights activists from Tibet, and Russia’s 
restrictions on Chechen civil society groups. 
 In this logic, the likelihood of democracies determining the institutional design of IOs is 
shaped by their relative weight in the membership, or what Pevehouse (2005: 46) refers to as 
the “democratic density” of an organization. It should be relatively easier for democracies to 
upload their polity preferences where they make up a larger share of the membership. By 
contrast, we can expect greater resistance in IOs where democracies make up a smaller share 
of the membership. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: The higher the democratic density of IO memberships, the greater the likelihood 
that IOs will be open. 
 
 Second, the opening up of IOs may be driven by credible-commitment motives among 
young democracies in IO memberships. This mechanism suggests that it is not the democratic 
component of an IO’s membership as a whole that matters (as above), but its newly 
democratized member states. These states may be old members that have transitioned to 
democracy, or new member states that join an IO upon democratization. The leaderships in 
these young democracies face particular incentives, since processes of consolidation take 
time, back-sliding remains a possibility, and government turn-over can derail reforms. To 
convince domestic and international audiences that democratic and policy reforms will stick, 
the new regimes attempt to “lock in” these reforms through political moves that will make 
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defection costly or difficult.2 One strand of this argument emphasizes how young regimes 
strive to lock in democratization internationally as a means of preventing future unravelling 
by non-democratic opponents (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). Another strand highlights 
how international commitments can help young democratic regimes to bolster economic or 
security-related reforms at home (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). In contrast to the first 
explanation, this mechanism assumes that there is no domestic consensus on political and 
policy reforms, and therefore a particular incentive for new democratic leaders is to tie their 
own hands and those of their successors. 
 Committing themselves to democratic principles of international organizations and 
treaties serves this purpose for new democracies. Pevehouse (2005) shows that membership in 
regional IOs, especially when conditional on domestic liberalization, can help new regimes to 
complete democratization by sending a strong signal that reforms will continue. Examples 
include the efforts of countries in Central and Eastern Europe to gain membership in the 
Council of Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the 
fall of the Berlin wall. Similarly, Moravcsik (2000) establishes that the primary proponents of 
reciprocally binding human rights obligations in Europe in the post-World War period were 
the regimes of newly democratized states with an interest to stabilize the political status quo 
against non-democratic threats. By contrast, established democracies were tepid and selective 
in their support. 
 This mechanism is based on the premise that openness in IOs can serve the same 
instrumental purpose. By supporting an institutional design of IOs that invites TNAs to 
monitor state behavior, regimes of fragile democracies raise domestic and international 
audience costs from defection, and strengthen the credibility of their commitments to political 
and policy reforms. TNAs are useful as compliance watchdogs, since they often have 
                                                     
2
 On credible commitment theory generally, see Fearon (1994); Leeds (1999); Simmons and Danner (2010). 
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privileged information about state behavior on the ground, and a willingness to act on it 
through shaming, complaints, and litigation. TNAs famously serve in this capacity in the 
monitoring of human rights worldwide, but also in areas such as environmental protection, 
trade, and democracy (Raustiala 1997; Simmons 2009; Kelley 2012). The costs from being 
exposed as a violator of international principles should be particularly high for young 
democracies, anxious to establish reputations as reliable members of the international 
community (Pevehouse 2005, 40; Milewicz and Elsig 2013).  
 TNA access may also provide information to domestic constituencies about whether 
their political leaders have fulfilled their promises. IOs “can convey information to voters 
about the behavior of their leaders, thus allowing voters to better judge their leaders” 
(Mansfield et al., 2002, 504). TNA access to IOs’ activities enables better distribution of this 
information, which domestic constituencies can use to punish new leaders if they were to 
renege on a promise. New democracies are more likely to lack the incentives and 
infrastructure to ensure adequate transparency domestically for constituents, increasing the 
value of TNA access as a channel of information on the credibility of commitments made by 
domestic leaders. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H2: The higher the share of new democracies in IO memberships, the greater the 
likelihood that IOs will be open.  
 
 Third, democracy’s effects on IO openness may be attributable to the ideology and 
influence of a democratic major power. Unlike the first mechanism, this explanation rests on 
the premise that states have unequal influence over the design of IOs, based on differentials in 
political and economic resources. Major powers will exploit their greater capacity for 
influence by promoting institutional designs in conformity with their ideology. Other states 
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accept these designs because they are compelled to do so by great powers. The expectation 
that relative power matters in design negotiations is well anchored in general theories of 
institutional design, as well as in a broad range of IR scholarship (Knight, 1992; Mearsheimer 
1994/95; Krasner 1991; Drezner 2007; Stone 2011). 
 In this vein, realists conventionally argue that democratic states employ liberal ideology 
to justify the pursuit of geopolitical interest. Donnelly (1986), for instance, submits that much 
of the explanation for the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights lies in the dominant 
power of the US, which exploited its hegemonic position to ensure the regime’s creation and 
support its operation. Waltz draws out the historical parallels of this logic: “Like some earlier 
great powers, we [the United States] can identify the presumed duty of the rich and powerful 
to help others with our own beliefs about what a better world would look like. England 
claimed to bear the white man’s burden; France spoke of her mission civilisatrice… For 
countries at the top, this is predictable behavior” (1979, 200). 
 The expectation that democratic great powers pursue their ideological preferences in 
international cooperation is often tested in empirical literature. Pevehouse (2005, 89-90) 
examines the possibility that successful promotion of democratization by regional IOs is not 
the product of the organizations per se, but reflects the influence of their most powerful 
members. Likewise, Moravcsik (2000) assesses the extent to which the origins of the 
European human rights regime are attributable to great powers extending their national ideals. 
However, in none of the cases does the evidence support this conjecture. 
 Extending this logic to IO openness, we would expect that democratic major powers 
advocate greater openness and are in a position to shape rules accordingly. These are states in 
which interaction with civil society actors is a constitutive component of domestic democratic 
ideology. In contrast, authoritarian major powers can be expected to resist such developments 
for the same reason. Where there is a single major power, the scope for this state to shape 
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design decisions could be extensive. Where there are multiple major powers, the outcome 
should reflect the parties’ relative bargaining power. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H3: Where democratic major powers stand unchallenged by authoritarian major powers, 
IOs are more likely to be open.  
 
 Each of our three mechanisms privileges a particular constellation of democratic actors 
within IOs: all democracies, new democracies, and democratic major powers. The better 
represented these actor categories are within IOs, the more likely IOs are to be open. Since 
one actor category does not exclude another, it is conceivable that democracy’s influence on 
openness both reflects independent and combined effects of these constellations of 
democracies. 
 However, none of these mechanisms theorize the institutional setting within which 
democracies must secure support for their preferences. While some IOs require that all 
member states agree for openness reforms to be adopted, other IOs only require the support of 
a majority of member states (Blake and Payton 2014). The impact of institutional rules on 
decision-making is widely theorized in rational institutionalist scholarship (Scharpf 1997; 
Meunier 2000; Tsebelis 2002), and we expect such dynamics to be present here as well.  
 Since most IOs have been closed at the point of establishment, arriving at openness 
requires reform decisions by a sufficiently large group of member states. When such decisions 
only demand the backing of a single or qualified majority of member states, openness is 
relatively easier to achieve, since autocracies must gather a large blocking minority or even 
majority to stop reforms. In contrast, when decision-making is governed by consensus or 
unanimity, it is formally sufficient with only one or a few recalcitrant autocracies to stop 
reforms, given the veto power that all parties enjoy under this rule. In practice, the effect of 
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institutional rules might be less dichotomous and more a question of distributing bargaining 
strength among the parties, thereby shaping the likelihood and terms of agreements. In this 
view, bargaining is a process that takes place in the shadow of decision rules, which condition 
the impact of actor constellations and preferences.  
 We expect this logic to pertain to the influence of all three categories of democracies in 
IO memberships. Everything else constant, it should be relatively easier for established 
democracies, new democracies, and democratic major powers to secure the support of the 
necessary number of member states when openness reforms can be adopted through majority 
voting. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H4: When decisions are taken by majority voting, democracies are more likely to be 
influential in institutional bargaining, and IOs more likely to be open. 
 
 
3 Democracy and IO Openness: Multivariate Analysis 
 
We now turn to a multivariate statistical analysis of the relationship between the democratic 
composition of IOs and TNA access under alternative decision rules. First, we introduce 
measurements of democracy in IO memberships and TNA access. In this context, we present 
a set of new indicators that capture the exact composition of democratic and autocratic IO 
membership. Second, we assess the explanatory power of the three mechanisms under 
different decision rules. Based on evidence from existing research, we start from the 
assumption that domestic democracy among IO member states is one of the main 
determinants of openness. While we control for alternative explanations, the main purpose of 
this analysis is therefore to empirically test which aspects of the democratic composition of 
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IOs contribute to variation in openness. As part of this, we also present a series of robustness 
checks and look more closely into the most significant results. 
 
3.1 Data and Measurement 
 
Beginning with the independent variables, we test Hypothesis 1 with a new measure of the 
democratic density of an IO that captures the share of democratic member states (Pevehouse 
2005). For this measure, we combine information on state membership in IOs from the COW-
IGO dataset with information on the democratic character of domestic regimes.3 For the latter, 
scholars have produced various measures and datasets over the past decades. While the Polity 
dataset is the most common, we use the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) data with a binary 
measure of democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010). For our purposes, this measure has two main 
advantages compared to the alternatives. First, the DD data capture all countries between 
1950 and 2008, including small states like Malta and Iceland that are not included in the 
Polity data. Having complete data on domestic regimes helps us to avoid a potential bias. 
Even if small states may not be the powerhouse of international politics, they still have a vote 
on the inclusion of TNAs, particularly in consensus-based IOs. Complete data on domestic 
regimes also allow us to assess whether there is a threshold share of democratic states – like a 
simple or two-third majority – that is necessary for democracies to shape the design of IOs 
through institutional bargaining, and to identify IOs with fully democratic or authoritarian 
memberships. Second, the percentage of democracies in an IO is a more meaningful measure 
than an average score of the member states’ level of democracy because an average does not 
offer any valuable clues on the distribution of democracies and autocracies. For example, if an 
                                                     
3
 We use this variable with a one-year lag, similar to all other independent variables (if not stated otherwise). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the risk of endogeneity is minimal, since we do not expect TNA access to IOs to 
affect domestic democracy of member states. Additional tests show that the results for this variable even hold for 
longer time lags. 
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IO’s membership has an average Polity IV score of 3, it could be composed of a combination 
of full democracies and authoritarian regimes – or it could be a club of anocracies. While we 
prefer the DD data for these reasons, our robustness checks include two variables based on the 
Polity IV scores of those member states of an IO for which this information is available: level 
of democracy and heterogeneity of regime. These measures are based on the mean and the 
standard deviation of the Polity IV scores, and capture the average level of democracy and the 
heterogeneity of regime types in an IO’s membership. In practice, we observe a high 
correlation between Polity IV and DD data (r=.96).4 
 We test Hypothesis 2 about the effect of credible commitment motives among new 
democracies with a variable that captures the share of young democracies among all member 
states of an IO. We calculate the percentage of member states – old and new – that have 
experienced a regime change from autocracy to democracy during the previous four years, 
which is the typical length of an electoral cycle. As with the first mechanism, we use the 
information on domestic regimes from the DD dataset to calculate the share of new 
democracies.   
 We test Hypothesis 3 on the influence of a major democratic power through a 
measurement that combines information on whether an IO has a major power in its 
membership with information on the domestic regimes of those powers.5  The result is a 
dummy for IOs that have at least one democratic major world or regional power, but no 
undemocratic major world or regional power that we can assume would veto access. In our 
robustness section, we control for the influence of the most powerful democracy – the United 
States – and test the reverse effect of a blockage of access reforms by non-democratic major 
powers. 
                                                     
4
 See Table A.3 in the online appendix available at this journa’s webpage for the bivariate correlation matrix of 
all variables. 
5
 We follow the operationalization of major power that is used in the COW Database, and add regional powers 
for the period after 1989 (Cline et al. 2011). 
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 Next to these variables, each capturing one mechanism and IO composition, we include 
two additional variables that measure changes to the composition of IOs. First, we include the 
variable democratization of old member states, which is a dummy indicating if at least one old 
member state has transitioned to democracy in the previous year. Second, we include the 
variable democratic accessions, which measures whether at least one democratic state has 
joined the IO in the previous year. Theoretically, these variables help us disaggregate the 
effect of changes to the composition of IO memberships. Both types of events boost the 
democratic density of an IO (Hypothesis 1), but do they generate the same effect on IO 
openness? Likewise, both types of events contribute to boosting the share of young 
democracies (if the acceding democracy is newly democratized) (Hypothesis 2), but do they 
lead to the same effect on TNA access? 
 For information on voting rules (Hypothesis 4), we draw on a recent dataset that 
distinguishes between alternative voting rules for an IO’s supreme decision-making body 
(Blake and Payton 2014).6 Under unanimity, a single member state can block a proposal. 
Under majority rule, each vote has the same weight, and single member states cannot prevent 
the adoption of a decision. For most IOs in this category, the voting rule requires a simple 
majority. 
 Turning to the dependent variable, we measure IO openness on the basis of a new 
dataset on formal TNA access to 298 organizational bodies of 50 IOs over the sixty-year 
period of 1950 to 2010.7 The IOs have been selected on the basis of a stratified random 
sample from a list of 182 international organizations, based on a revised and updated version 
                                                     
6
 Information on five IOs in our sample was missing in the Blake and Payton (2014) data. We added these cases 
with the help of the codebook for the dataset “Voting Rules for Intergovernmental Organizations.” In the 
absence of clear theoretical expectations, we did not include the third category of weighted majority voting. 
7
 See Table A.1 in the online appendix. 
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of the Correlates of War IGO Dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2004).8 Our selection includes IOs 
from ten different policy domains and all world regions. We stratified the sample to ensure 
that the larger population of IOs was adequately represented. As a result, our sample includes 
major IOs, as well as lesser-known regional and specialized organizations. TNA access 
normally is regulated at the level of IO bodies, and previous research has shown that access 
varies significantly within IOs (Tallberg et al. 2013, 56, 68-70). Only few IOs open up all 
bodies at the same time. For example, the World Bank administration established formal 
access rules in 1981, whereas other World Bank bodies in our sample followed much later 
(Inspection Panel in 1993; Board of Governors in 1999) or never (Board of Directors). Even 
though our main independent variables do not vary within IOs, openness clearly does, as do 
many important control variables. For this reason, we operate with the IO body as the unit of 
analysis.  
 The information included in these data refers to formal rules of access, granted to TNAs 
through decisions either by the member states or the bureaucracy of an IO. Formal rules 
include provisions in treaties, protocols, and conventions, as well as regulations in rules of 
procedure and administrative decisions. The data have been collected on the basis of 
documents from archives and databases, and where necessary, through direct data requests to 
the relevant IOs.  
 Our dependent variable is a binary measure of openness that captures whether an IO 
body has an arrangement for TNA participation in place or not. This measure reveals that 
institutional arrangements for TNA access have become much more common over time. 
Between 1950 and 1989, mainly bodies of European, American, and global IOs were open. 
Pioneers were bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Court of Human Rights. After the end of the Cold War, the adoption 
                                                     
8
 To be included, an organization must: (1) be intergovernmental; (2) be independent from other IOs as regards 
budgets, decision-making, and reporting; (3) have at least three members; (4) have at least one organization body 
that operates permanently; and (5) be active in 2010. 
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of access arrangements took off dramatically, and this development spanned all issue areas 
and world regions. For 2010, 208 out of 294 bodies in our sample were open to TNAs. 
 In addition, we control for the influence of non-regime-based explanations. These 
variables are drawn from a recent study that examines a broad range of explanations for 
variation in TNA access (Tallberg et al., 2013).9 We assess the effects of a participatory 
discourse in global governance by an indicator based on references in scientific and non-
scientific publications (Charnovitz 1997; Saurugger 2010). Moreover, we test whether the UN 
has functioned as a norm entrepreneur in the spread of TNA access through the indicator UN 
conferences (Clark et al. 1998; Willetts 2000). We also include variables to test whether 
challenges by civil society actors make IOs more likely to open up, as a way of securing 
organizational legitimacy (O’Brien et al. 2000; Kissling and Steffek 2008). We measure 
media references to protests against IOs, estimate the effects of protests against similar IOs, 
and test whether contentiousness make IOs more likely to open up through the variable media 
coverage.  We use three indicators to assess the rational functionalist argument that TNA 
access is influenced by the nature of each IO body’s governance tasks (Raustiala 1997; 
Tallberg et al. 2013). We expect a positive effect on access for IO bodies that engage in tasks 
that are technically complex, require local activities, and present significant non-compliance 
incentives. We measure the influence of sovereignty costs associated with TNA access 
through two variables, assuming that such costs are higher for decision-making bodies and 
bodies in the field of security (Hawkins et al. 2006; Bradley and Kelley 2008). To assess 
whether IOs with extensive resource deficits will have stronger incentives to involve TNAs, 
we include the variable IO budget (Liese 2010, 97). To evaluate whether the degree of 
political conflict among member states affects the provision of TNA access, we include the 
variable affinity of member states (Raustiala 1997, 731; Kahler 2005, 29). Finally, we assess 
                                                     
9
 For a detailed description of the operationalization of these control variables, see Table A.4 in the online 
appendix. 
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whether TNA supply affects the extent to which TNAs are granted access to IOs (Reimann 
2006; Steffek 2012). 
 
 
3.2 Statistical Analysis 
 
The multivariate analysis lends strong support to the argument that democracy’s effect on IO 
openness is driven by democracies’ ability to secure support for their polity preferences. Our 
analysis shows that TNA access is shaped by the relative weight of democracies within IOs 
(Hypothesis 1). We also find that the presence of a major democratic power in the 
membership of an IO had a positive effect on IO openness during the Cold War, but not after 
1990 (Hypothesis 3). In contrast, the analysis offers limited evidence in favor of a particular 
role for new democracies (Hypothesis 2). Last, we show that decision rules matter, with 
majority rule strengthening the effect of and interaction between different categories of 
democracies (Hypothesis 4). 
 As the dependent variable is binary, we use logistic regression to estimate the effects of 
democratic memberships on IO openness (Table 1). The dependent variable and most control 
variables vary at the level of IO bodies, so that we estimate the equation 
 
Logit(Access)ix, t =  ∝ + β1Demorcratic densityi,t-1 + β2Young democraciesi, t-1+ β3Democratic 
poweri, t-1 + γ Wix, t-1 + δ Zi, t-1 + t + t2 +t3+ ei,x ,  
 
where Logit(Access) denotes the logit function of the likelihood that a body x in IO i provides 
TNA access, W is a vector for control variables that vary at the level of IO i’s body x, Z is a 
vector for control variables that vary at the level of IO i, t, t2 and t3 are our controls for time 
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dependence, and εi,x is the error term. We cluster the data at the body level to account for 
potential dependence between units, employ robust standard errors in all models, and enter all 
time-variant independent variables with a lag of one year if no other specification is 
mentioned.10 
 Model 1 includes one variable for each mechanism, along with the non-regime type 
control variables from existing research on TNA access that help us to avoid omitted variable 
bias. We then look into interactions between the three mechanisms (Models 2-4) and re-
estimate Models 1 to 4 for IOs with majority rule (Models 5-8) and IOs with consensus rule 
(Models 9-12). We evaluate the robustness of the results from Table 1 in four different ways 
(Table 2). First, we control for the time period, estimating the effects of the three mechanisms 
for the period before 1990 (Model 13) and after 1990 (Model 14). Second, we test if our 
results are influenced by a European norm by excluding IOs with a majority of European 
member states (Model 15). In addition, we assess if the results hold with alternative measures 
for the three mechanisms (Models 16-18). Finally, we control for alternative specifications of 
the model. We substitute control variables with IO dummies (Model 19), aggregate the data 
from IO body level to IO level (Model 20), and run a conditional fixed-effects logit (Model 
21). We report the results in three steps, first describing direct effects, then interaction effects, 
and finally marginal effects. 
 The analysis shows that the democratic density of an IO’s membership has a strongly 
positive and highly statistically significant effect on the likelihood that an IO body will 
provide access to TNAs. This finding holds across all models and also for different 
specifications (Model 19-21) and lends firm support to Hypothesis 1. The greater the overall 
share of democracies in an IO’s membership, the more likely that democratic polity 
preferences guide the design of IOs in terms of TNA access. We observe a strong positive 
                                                     
10
 Summary statistics (Table A.2) and bivariate correlations (A.3) of the main variables are shown in the online 
appendix. 
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effect for IOs with both majority and consensus rule (Models 5 and 9), which speaks in favor 
of the strength of this factor. We further find that democratic density had a significant effect 
on IO openness both during and after the Cold War (Models 13 and 14), and that this effect is 
not reducible to European dominance (Model 15). Finally, we establish that the effect of 
democratic density holds for the alternative measure based on the average Polity IV score for 
each IO as well, and that the heterogeneity of political regimes in an IO does not affect 
openness (Model 16). The latter finding suggests that it is not the mix of regime types in a 
membership, in terms of varying degrees of democratic consolidation, that matters, but 
whether member states are democracies or not.11 
 We find mixed evidence for an effect of democratic major powers on IO openness 
(Hypothesis 3). While there is no effect for the full sample of IOs (Model 1), a division of IOs 
into majority and consensus organizations reveals that democratic major powers have a 
significant effect on openness in the former (Models 5 and 9). When democratic major 
powers only need to secure the support of a majority of member states, they have been more 
influential, endorsing Hypothesis 4 while challenging claims in existing literature that great 
powers are equally or more influential in consensus IOs (Stone 2011). Furthermore, we find 
that democratic major powers were consequential for IO openness during the Cold War, but 
have not been so in the post-Cold War era (Models 13 and 14). During the Cold War period 
of East-West tension, the support of major democracies, such as the US, France and the 
United Kingdom, was thus conducive to greater IO openness toward TNAs. We also assess 
whether the effect of a democratic major power on IO openness primarily is a consequence of 
US leadership (Model 17). While only two IOs in the sample have this composition, the result 
is positively statistically significant. 
  
                                                     
11
 This lends support to the dichotomous democracy/autocracy measure we use in all other models. 
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Table 1: Logit Regression of TNA Access 
 
 All IOs IOs with majority rule IOs with consensus rule 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Democratic 
density 
1.779 1.693 1.629 1.782 3.157 2.691 2.868 3.112 2.143 2.099 1.891 2.146 
(0.422)*** (0.453)*** (0.488)*** (0.422)*** (1.156)*** (1.166)** (1.236)** (1.152)*** (0.506)*** (0.556)*** (0.508)*** (0.507)*** 
Young 
democracies  
0.057 -0.667 -0.648 -0.128 0.034 -1.938 0.003 -0.084 -0.046 -0.405 -0.285 0.028 
(0.508) (0.814) (0.821) (0.559) (0.591) (0.840)** (0.581) (0.569) (0.784) (1.329) (0.797) (0.856) 
Democratic 
major power  
0.207 0.198 -0.273 0.100 2.728 2.640 0.754 2.391 -0.713 -0.721 -2.125 -0.674 
(0.298) (0.298) (0.773) (0.307) (0.664)*** (0.661)*** (1.300) (0.649)*** (0.433) (0.440) (1.415) (0.452) 
Density* 
Young dem. 
 1.811 1.220   5.530    0.863   
 (1.462) (1.564)   (2.380)**    (2.361)   
Density* 
dem. power 
  0.492    3.394    1.711  
  (0.983)    (1.641)**    (1.625)  
Young dem.* 
dem. power 
  1.668 1.601    3.825    -0.727 
  (1.185) (1.461)    (2.435)    (1.758) 
 
Non-regime  
control variables 1 
 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
Constant -9.038 -8.986 -8.479 -8.568 -8.130 -7.662 -7.797 -6.444 -2.024 -2.059 -1.944 -2.167 
 (2.369)*** (2.387)*** (2.445)*** (2.401)*** (6.951) (6.961) (6.827) (7.214) (4.201) (4.180) (4.348) (4.175) 
Log-likelihood -3646.41 -3643.73 -3640.54 -3643.46 -700.80 -696.27 -696.79 -699.22 -1755.19 -1754.88 -1747.88 -1754.94 
AIC 1.145 1.151 1.150 1.151 0.927 0.923 0.923 0.926 0.994 0.994 0.990 0.994 
N 6,369 6,369 6,369 6,369 1,555 1,555 1,555 1,555 3,573 3,573 3,573 3,573 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Logit regression of TNA Access at the level of IO bodies. Robust standard errors clustered at IO body level in parentheses; 1 Non-regime-
based control variables (Table A.4) included, but only displayed in Table A.5 in the online appendix. Time, time2 and time3 included, but not displayed. 
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 We find least support for the third mechanism, privileging credible commitment 
motives among new democracies. The share of young democracies is only weakly statistically 
significant after the Cold War (Model 14), and not in any other model assessing direct effects. 
This suggests that credible commitment motives among new democracies may have had a 
positive effect on TNA access after 1989, but cannot account for the large part of 
democracy’s effect on IO openness. Instead, the most important consequence of new 
democracies is probably their positive contribution to the overall democratic density of IOs 
(Hypothesis 1). 
 The results on the two measures of change in the democratic composition of IO 
membership help us to further interpret these findings (Model 18). The results show that 
recent democratization of old member states, but not the accession of democracies, increases 
the likelihood of TNA access. Democratization of old member states is highly statistically 
significant, while democratic accessions is not significant. This result suggests that there is 
something about the democratization of authoritarian member states that affects the likelihood 
of openness differently than democratic accessions, despite identical effects on democratic 
density.12 We suspect that it might be the unlocking of access reforms previously blocked by 
the democratizing member state. Hence, democratization of existing member states may have 
a dual effect on IO openness: it removes their resistance to reforms already considered, and it 
boosts the strength of the democratic camp, thus improving the odds for future openness 
reforms. 
  
                                                     
12
 This result may also be interpreted as support for the logic of credible commitments (Hypothesis 2), since 
democratization of old member states boosts the share of young democracies in an IO’s membership. However, 
since our core measure for the credible commitment logic receives limited support, we favor interpreting this 
variable in terms of its effects on the democratic density of IOs (Hypothesis 1). 
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Table 2: Logit regression of TNA access – Robustness checks 
 Before 1990 After 1990 No European  
dominance 
Alternative measures Dummy IO IO-level Conditional 
logit 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Democratic density  2.703 1.466 1.545  1.751 1.826 2.300 1.949 10.522 
(0.726)*** (0.420)*** (0.494)***  (0.434)*** (0.388)*** (1.040)** (0.656)*** (2.001)*** 
Level of democracy MS (Polity IV)    0.116      
   (0.032)***      
Heterogeneity of regime (Polity IV)    0.036      
   (0.055)      
Young democracies 1.083 -0.374 0.567 -0.412 0.156  -1.231 -0.474 -0.308 
(0.912) (0.558) (0.539) (0.481) (0.537)  (1.200) (0.510) (0.874) 
Democratic major power  1.308 -0.200 0.530 0.238   -0.225 -0.817 -7.094 
(0.486)*** (0.301) (0.373) (0.300)   (0.619) (0.469)* (13.047) 
US democratic major power      0.663     
    (0.361)*     
Authoritarian major power     -0.104     
    (0.335)     
Democratization of old MS      0.255    
     (0.104)**    
Democratic accessions      0.120    
     (0.126)    
Non-regime 
control variables 1 … … … … … … - …  
Constant -8.670 -38.721 -8.221 -8.626 -8.994 -7.257 -22.480 -6.773  
 (9.316) (32.519) (3.178)*** (2.380)*** (2.417)*** (2.217)*** (1.923)*** (6.409)  
Log likelihood -1130.69 --2333.57 -2391.34 -3638.44 -3621.81 -3851.04 -3216.15 -631.48 -258.20 
AIC 1.027 1.140 1.157 1.161 1.144 1.143 0.871 0.947 5.424 
N 2,240 4,129 4,167 6,304 6,369 6,774 7,261 1376 2679 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Model 13-18, 19, 21: Logit regression of TNA Access at the level of IO bodies. Robust standard clustered at IO body level errors in 
parentheses; 1 Non-regime-based control variables (Table A.4) included, but only displayed in Table A.6 in the online appendix. Time, time2 and time3 included, but not 
displayed. Model 19: IO dummy variables. Model 20: Conditional fixed-effects logit. Model 21: Data at IO level, robust standard clustered at IO level. 
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 Shifting to interaction effects, the results show that the three mechanisms combine in 
generating higher levels of openness. However, these positive and significant interaction 
effects only hold for IOs with majority rule, not consensus IOs, generating support for 
Hypothesis 4. While the presence of democratic major powers and young democracies had 
partial or no effects on IO openness on their own, they have significant and positive effects 
when interacted with democratic density (Models 6 and 7). Substantively, this means that 
different constellations of democracies have mutually reinforcing effects on TNA access to 
IOs, as long as openness reforms only require the support of a majority of member states. The 
already significant effect of a democratic membership on openness increases further with the 
number of young democracies and the presence of a democratic major power. This suggests 
that young and powerful democracies function as openness entrepreneurs in the broader group 
of democracies, but only are successful in this role when IOs are relatively democratic and 
ruled by majorities. 
 Several of our non-regime control variables display significant results as well. We find 
a strong positive and significant effect of non-compliance incentives on TNA access to bodies 
engaged in monitoring and enforcement for the full period and after 1990 (Model 14). 
Together with a positive and significant effect of local activity after 1990, this finding 
corroborates research that emphasizes functional reasons for private access to IOs after the 
end of the Cold War. The analysis also offers firm support for an effect of sovereignty costs. 
The variable decision-making has a significant negative effect on TNA access before 1990 
(Model 13), while this effect disappears in the later period, as decision-making bodies, too, 
have begun to open up. In addition, there is a strong significant, negative effect for security 
across all time periods. The effect of IO budget is also significant, suggesting that IOs with 
larger resources are more likely to grant access. We also find a positive effect of TNA supply 
for the period after 1990, suggesting that the existence of a large NGO population has 
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influenced the likelihood of access during the past two decades. We observe a positive effect 
of protests against IOs, and a negative effect for participatory discourse on TNA access 
before 1990. Finally, our results show that the effects of some control variables vary with 
decision rules. For instance, we see a negative effect of IO budget and a positive effect of UN 
conferences for majority-rule IOs (Model 4-6). The consistently positive effect of democratic 
density in both majority- and consensus-based IOs stands out even more in light of this 
variation. 
 We now focus in depth on the most significant finding by exploring the substantial 
significance of democratic density on IO openness over time and under different decision 
rules. Figure 2 displays the democratic density of the IOs in our sample over time, as well as 
separate measures of the share of IOs with a majority of democratic member states, only 
democratic member states, and no democratic member states. The democratic density was 
relatively high from 1950 to the mid-1960s, decreased abruptly in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, before it began to grow again, eventually leading up to a share of 70.2 percent in 2008. 
The democratic density at the end of the observation period only marginally exceeded the 
level at the beginning of the period. Hence, in order to fully understand the effect of 
democratic density, we need to disaggregate this variable. Figure 2 shows that the share of 
IOs with a majority of democratic members increased significantly between the late 1980s 
and 2000, while the shares of purely democratic or autocratic IOs remained fairly constant 
over time. This pattern suggests that the central change to the composition of IOs, captured by 
the variable democratic density, pertains to the control of IOs by a majority of democratic 
states. 
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Figure 2. Democratic Density of IOs in Sample 
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 Figure 3 goes one step further by demonstrating how the marginal effect of democratic 
density on IO openness varies in strength at different levels of democratic density. For this 
purpose, we plot the marginal effects of democratic density on our binary measure of TNA 
access for the full observation period (based on Model 1), for the periods before and after 
1990 (based on Models 13 and 14), and for different majority and consensus rule IOs (based 
on Models 5 and 9). The figure for the full time period indicates that the strength of the 
marginal effect grows more or less continuously. Yet the slope indicates a stronger increase in 
the marginal effect between 30 and 60 percent democratic density, suggesting that the 
command of a majority of member states is particularly important for democracies to 
influence IO openness. As we move from 0 to 100 percent democratic density in an 
organization, the likelihood of that IO being open doubles. 
 The figures for the two sub-periods offer a clearer picture of these effects. In the period 
1950 to 1990, the marginal effect of democratic density on IO openness increased 
continuously and was particularly strong in organizations with a majority of democratic 
members. Hence, during the Cold War, the democratic composition of IOs mainly mattered 
when IOs were made up of at least 50 percent democracies; at lower levels of democratic 
density, the effect of this variable was weaker. In the category of IOs with a democratic 
majority in 1980 (19), those with a democratic density over 95 percent had a much higher 
likelihood of having at least one open body. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) offers an over-time illustration: as the share of democratic member 
states grew from 86 to 100 percent during the 1970s, the number of open bodies almost 
doubled. 
 After the end of the Cold War, the marginal effect of democratic density is stronger. 
This holds for all levels of democratic density, with the exception of IOs with more than 95 
percent democratic membership, where the effect is almost the same as before 1990. During 
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this period, the effect of democracies is strong already at lower levels of democratic density. 
However, the effect does not increase as steeply with higher proportions of democracies in an 
IO’s membership as before 1990. Hence, after 1990, a smaller group of democracies in an IO 
is sufficient for the likelihood of access to increase substantially. While it still matters if IOs 
are populated by a majority of democracies, the effect is more even and it matters less if they 
were entirely composed of democracies. The 1990s were a period when many global IOs 
reached a level of more than 50 percent democratic member states. This was paralleled by 
growing openness toward TNAs. The World Bank, for instance, went from a democratic 
density of 47 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000, and simultaneously tripled the share of 
open bodies. 
 The figure depicting the marginal effects of democratic density in majority and 
consensus rule IOs underscores the result from the regression analysis in terms of clear 
positive effects in both types of IOs. However, as opposed to the regression analysis, the 
figure also points to a notable difference between majority and consensus IOs, supporting 
Hypothesis 4 on the importance of decision rules. While there is no difference in the marginal 
effect at lower levels of democratic density, and the direction of the effect is the same, the 
effect increases more steeply in majority IOs than in consensus IOs once democracies make 
up more than 50 percent of the membership. This suggests that the threshold for agreeing on 
openness reforms matters: once democracies make up about half of the membership, the 
likelihood of a majority-rule IO being open increases significantly. Underscoring the same 
point, the figure also shows that the strength of the marginal effect is the same at a democratic 
density of 60 percent in majority IOs and 100 percent in consensus IOs. In other words, it 
takes an entirely democratic membership for democracy to have an equally strong effect on 
openness in consensus IOs as it has with 60 percent democracies in majority IOs. When 
combined with the pattern showed in Figure 2, these results demonstrate that majority 
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relationships matter in two important ways for the expansion of openness in global 
governance: one the one hand, the most central change in the democratic composition of IOs 
over time is the growing share of IOs where democracies make up a majority of the 
membership; on the other hand, the effect on openness is particularly strong in majority-rule 
IOs where democracies make up at least 50 percent of the membership. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Democratic Density on TNA Access  
 
 
 
Note: The gray lines display the margins of the 95% confidence intervals.
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4 Case Study: Democracy and Openness in the OSCE 
 
The statistical analysis showed that the democratic composition of IOs primarily affects 
openness through democracies’ combined weight in these organizations, rather than the 
presence of young or powerful democracies. In this section, we complement the statistical 
analysis with a case study of democracy and openness in the OSCE, in accordance with 
principles of a nested mixed-method design (Lieberman 2005; see also Gerring 2007, 91-93). 
In a model-testing small-N analysis (SNA), the purpose is to supplement the large-N analysis 
(LNA) with in-depth study of an “on-the-line” case as a way of demonstrating the robustness 
of the causal argument. “As the goal is to complement the LNA, the use of SNA in nested 
analysis should aim to gain contextually based evidence that a particular causal model or 
theory actually ‘worked’ in the manner specified by the model” (Lieberman, 2005, 442). Such 
a case study increases the confidence in the statistical finding and provides a check on 
spurious correlation. 
 The OSCE is an appropriate case for these purposes. It is drawn from the broader 
sample of 50 IOs and conforms well to the theoretically predicted and statistically established 
relationship between democratic density and openness. While founded with a mixed 
membership during the Cold War, the organization subsequently experienced a 
democratization of the membership that greatly increased its democratic density. This 
transformation coincided with an extensive expansion of openness to TNAs. Given this 
pattern, the function of the case study is to show how these factors are causally related as 
predicted.13  
 The OSCE was created during the détente period of the early 1970s as the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue 
                                                     
13
 Since the decision rule remained consensus throughout this period, the case study does not allow us to trace 
the implications of varying decision rules on openness. 
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and negotiation between East and West. Comprised of 35 states, the CSCE was divided 
between a group of democratic states, including the US, Canada and West European states, 
and a group of non-democracies, including the USSR and its aligned states. During the Cold 
War period, TNA access to the CSCE was extremely limited. The lack of openness applied 
equally to all policy fields that the CSCE addressed, which included political and security 
issues, economic and environmental issues, and humanitarian issues. While the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975, the foundational document of the CSCE, stated that “institutions, organizations 
and persons have a relevant and positive role to play” (CSCE, 1975), the only access to the 
CSCE was for “press and guests of delegations” to observe plenary opening and closing 
sessions.14   
 The lack of openness was not caused by an absence of proposals for more TNA 
involvement. Rather, throughout the 1970s and 80s, democratic states (Western bloc) often 
pushed for greater access for TNAs. Yet, non-democratic member states (Eastern bloc) 
blocked such proposals from being adopted. For example, in the negotiation of the Helsinki 
Final Act, Western states pushed for more far-reaching agreement on the involvement of 
TNAs, while the Eastern bloc preferred the more vaguely worded provision eventually 
adopted (Bloed 1990, 10). Likewise, during the 1977-1978 Follow-up Meeting of Belgrade, 
Western states proposed to “strengthen the role of private citizens in the process of détente in 
respect of human rights and humanitarian issues. In contrast, the East European States 
stressed the intergovernmental nature of détente…” (Bloed 1990, 13). Yet another example is 
the 1985 Meeting of Experts on Respect for Human Rights in Ottawa, when Western 
diplomats tried to push for as many open sessions as possible, which Soviet diplomats 
opposed.15 
                                                     
14
 Van Esterik and Minnema (1991, 4) explain that NGOs were often able to acquire media accreditation.  
15
 “West wants press at human rights talks,” The Globe and Mail, May 7, 1985; “Ottawa meeting on human 
rights opens; agenda and dispute,” New York Times, May 8, 1985. 
35 
 
 The Eastern bloc’s resistance to TNA access was triggered by trepidation that access 
would enable opposition to the regimes to gain greater traction. The Eastern bloc had already 
found that the Helsinki Final Act contributed to the formation of independent NGOs in the 
Eastern bloc (Tudyka 2001; Brett 1993; Bloed 1990). Many of these groups invoked the 
Helsinki Final Act as a symbol of human rights in their resistance to the regimes (Bloed 1990, 
12; Tudyka 2001, 465). As a result, Eastern states believed TNA access to the CSCE would 
embolden NGOs who were viewed as traitors, and thus blocked the proposals for greater 
openness put forward by Western democratic states. The difference of view on TNA access 
“led to heated debates and…delayed preparatory meetings, particularly in the period 1980 to 
1986, at times placing the whole CSCE edifice in the balance” (Heraclides 1993, 119). 
 The absence of TNA access during the Cold War era was largely a consequence of the 
distribution of democratic and non-democratic states within the CSCE, given that 
democracies and non-democracies held differing preferences on openness. While democracies 
were proponents of access to the CSCE, they jointly lacked the combined weight to determine 
the institutional design under a rule of consensus. To illustrate, Figure 4 depicts the balance 
between democratic and non-democratic states within the OSCE membership over four cross-
sections of time. In 1980, the distribution of democracies versus non-democracies was 
relatively equally balanced. Since the CSCE operated by consensus, any concerted objection 
from non-democratic states could prevent the adoption of Western proposals. 
 The end of the Cold War brought a transformation of the access opportunities for TNAs. 
A wave of reforms in the 1990s made the organization much more open to TNAs, especially 
as the CSCE transformed into the OSCE and developed an organizational structure. The shift 
toward a more open OSCE was marked by the adoption of the 1990 Charter of Paris. The 
Charter affirmed the commitment to facilitate the activities of NGOs, other groups, and 
individuals “for the implementation of the CSCE commitments by the participating  
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Figure 4. The Democratic Composition of the OSCE 
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States,” and that these groups “must be involved in an appropriate way in the activities and 
new structures of the CSCE” (CSCE, 1990a). At the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference 
on the Human Dimension of the CSCE later that same year, the participating states agreed on 
new rules, which granted TNAs access to the conference premises, unimpeded contacts with 
state delegates, accreditation of media representatives, access to official conference 
documents, and opportunities to distribute relevant information to delegates (CSCE 1990b).  
 Further reforms in the 1990s included the creation of an NGO unit within the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and permission for NGOs to speak at the 
first Human Dimension Implementation Meetings (HDIM) in 1993 (Brett 1996, 683). TNA 
access also expanded to the field of security. Field missions became accessible to TNAs in the 
mid-1990s through the “Platform for Co-operative Security,” which included mechanisms for 
regular exchange of information, appointment of liaisons, and development of common 
projects and training efforts (OSCE 1999, 44). By the end of the 1990s, the OSCE had become 
a relatively open IO, providing TNAs with some form of access to most of its organizational 
bodies and all policy domains. 
 This opening up of the CSCE/OSCE in the 1990s was driven by a transformation of the 
organization’s membership following the collapse of Communism. Democratization in the 
former Eastern bloc, and a splintering of former Eastern bloc states into independent states, 
meant that the CSCE became comprised of mostly democratic states. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
the group of democratic states made up a vast majority of the membership in 1990, while the 
group of non-democracies dwindled to a very small portion. Overall, the 1990s was the period 
of greatest democratic density for the CSCE/OCSE, and this corresponded with the opening of 
the OSCE. 
 Collectively, democracies were now sufficiently strong to set the institutional agenda of 
the CSCE/OSCE. While old democracies remained as some of the most fervent supporters of 
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TNA access, new democracies joined them in their preference for openness. For example, 
during the Helsinki Follow-Up meeting in 1992, two proposals for TNA access were put 
forward by Austria and the UK.16 Each of these proposals envisioned a more open OSCE and 
was co-sponsored by both strong democratic states and newly democratizing states. Austria’s 
proposal was co-sponsored by the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, Russian and Lithuania, while the UK’s proposal was co-sponsored by Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Georgia (Heraclides 1993, 122-123). In the end, 
the Helsinki meeting decided to extend to all CSCE meetings the previously established 
guidelines for NGO access to human dimension meetings, and to “instruct Directors of CSCE 
institutions and Executive Secretaries of CSCE meetings to designate an ‘NGO liaison person’ 
from among their staff” (CSCE 1992, 17-18).  
 The debate over NGOs was no longer about whether they should be granted access, but 
on what terms (Brett 1992, 22). Rhetoric of respect and appreciation for NGOs had supplanted 
the Soviet bloc’s earlier suspicion of NGOs. The shift in polity preferences among new 
democracies was facilitated by the arrival of a new set of leaders. Leaders from the former 
opposition movements were now often central figures in the new democratic governments. 
Prominent examples include Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic and Lech Walesa in Poland. 
This shaped the perspectives of the new governments on TNA access. For instance, at the 
Helsinki meeting in 1992, the Armenian Foreign Minister explained that he was formerly an 
NGO representative who recognized the value of having a seat at the table and what it is like 
to try to have a voice in the process (Brett 1992, 22). Opposition movements had for a long 
time been strong advocates of principles of democratic rule at the national level, which fuelled 
their desire as new state officials to support openness in the OSCE. 
 The ability of democracies to push through reforms for more access came to a halt in the 
                                                     
16
 A non-paper was also submitted by the US (Heraclides, 1993, 122). 
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early 2000s, when the democratic density of the organization declined. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
the portion of democratic states in 2000 was lower than in 1990. As some member states 
backslid in their transition to democracy (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), 
they began to question TNA access again. For instance, backsliding states have at times sought 
to exclude specific NGOs from participation (Bloed 2007; Bakker 2007). A case in point is 
Russia’s attempt to block participation of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (Bloed 
2007). Multiple examples point to TNA access being a source of conflict between East and 
West. Yet, the democratic density of the OSCE has remained high enough to prevent 
retrenchment in TNA access. 
 To summarize, the OSCE illustrates well the causal process linking democratic density 
and openness in IOs. During the Cold War, the relative weight of democracies in the IO was 
too low for them to impose their polity preferences on recalcitrant autocracies. As the 
composition of the organization’s membership changed after 1989, and new democracies 
sided with old democracies, extensive openness reforms became possible. 
 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
IOs have become increasingly open to TNAs over recent decades. At the same time, 
significant variation remains across IOs in the extent to which they engage with TNAs. 
Existing research suggests that domestic democracy in the membership of IOs is the most 
powerful determinant of these patterns, but has refrained from exploring the mechanisms that 
could explain this effect. This article closes this gap by theorizing and empirically assessing 
how the democratic composition of IOs matters for openness, based on a combination of 
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statistical analysis and a case study of the OSCE. Our conclusion briefly summarizes the 
findings of the analysis and expands on their implications. 
 We find that democracy’s effect on IO openness primarily is the product of the 
combined weight of all democracies in an IO’s membership and their resulting capacity to 
secure support for their polity preferences. Democratic member states have worked to extend 
the liberal democratic ideals they value domestically to the sphere of global governance. The 
likelihood of success has been shaped by the share of democracies in the overall membership. 
During the Cold War, openness reforms were difficult to push through, as many IOs were 
composed of democracies and autocracies in relatively equal numbers, and competition 
among political systems ran high. For democracy to have a strong effect on IO openness, it 
took a highly democratic membership. As a result, most of the forerunners among open IOs 
were democratic clubs, such as the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council, and the OECD. 
After the end of the Cold War, democracies have been considerably more successful. Not 
only do democracies make up a larger share of IOs nowadays; in addition, it takes less 
democratic density in an IO for democratic polity preferences to have a strong impact. After 
1989, it has often been sufficient for democracies to gather a majority in order for them to 
successfully upload democratic standards of openness to IOs. As a result, we have seen the 
creation and expansion of openness arrangements in most IOs in the world, save those 
composed exclusively of authoritarian states, such as the Arab-Maghreb Union and the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Our case study of the OSCE illustrates 
this development by tracing how democratization in Central and Eastern Europe strengthened 
the democratic camp within the IO at the expense of its authoritarian component, thereby 
paving the way for openness reforms. 
 These findings stand in contrast to the results for the two other mechanisms. While new 
democracies have been particularly eager to sign human rights treaties and to join IOs out of 
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credible commitment motives, they have not played a profound role in the creation and 
expansion of IO openness, despite the expectation that TNA access is conducive to 
monitoring the domestic and international commitments of new democracies. This does not 
mean that new democracies do not matter; they do, but primarily through adding weight to the 
democratic camps of IOs, thereby increasing the likelihood that openness reforms can be 
pushed through. Likewise, the presence and influence of democratic major powers in IO 
memberships is only granted partial support in our analysis. While this factor was decisive 
during the Cold War, when US leadership pushed IOs toward greater openness, having a 
democratic state as dominant power has mattered little after 1989, when most of the 
expansion of TNA access has taken place. 
 Our analysis further shows that decision rules in IOs matter for the impact of 
democracies on openness. When we disaggregated our sample of IOs by decision rule, three 
additional findings emerged that all speak to the positive consequences of majority rule for 
democracies’ ability to open up global governance. First, the substantive effect of an IO’s 
democratic density on openness is considerably stronger where democracies only need to 
gather the support of a majority of the membership, as opposed to the entire membership. 
Second, democratic major powers positively affect the openness of majority-rule IOs, but not 
consensus-rule IOs. Third, where IOs are subject to majority decision-making, different 
constellations of democratic states – established democracies, new democracies, and 
democratic major powers – have a mutually reinforcing effect on IO openness.  
 By providing us with a better grasp of the mechanisms that underpin democracy’s effect 
on IO openness, these findings have two broader implications. First, we highlight a source of 
institutional design in global governance that so far has received less extensive attention. The 
dominant approaches to date are rational functionalism, with its emphasis on cooperation 
problems, and sociological institutionalism, with its emphasis on organizational culture and 
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institutional isomorphism (Koremenos et al. 2001; Hawkins et al. 2006; Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Acharya and Johnston 2007). We argue that regime type constitutes a third 
important explanation of international institutional design. This notion is reinforced by 
findings that institutional arrangements for transparency, accountability, and dispute 
settlement, too, appear to be systematically shaped by the domestic political systems of 
member states (Grigorescu 2007, 2010; Keohane et al. 2000; Hooghe et al. 2013). An urgent 
task for future research is to identify the scope conditions for this explanation. We find it 
reasonable to hypothesize that democracy’s effects are restricted to – or at least particularly 
strong for – international design dimensions that tap into the constitutive differences between 
democratic and autocratic political systems. 
 Second, and by extension, we join those who highlight domestic regime type as an 
explanation of international political phenomena. While most closely associated with the 
democratic peace program, this liberal explanation is nowadays invoked to account for a 
growing range of international outcomes, where institutional design is only the most recent. 
The more common the finding that domestic regime type matters, the more important it 
becomes to identify the mechanisms that drive democracy’s effects. While others have moved 
down this path by exploring variation in, for instance, executive-legislative relations (Davis 
2012), this article has shown the usefulness of distinguishing between mechanisms on the 
basis of variation in the composition of IOs. 
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